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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
#2A-8/7/80 
RENSSELAER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
Respondent, : BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
-and- : 
CASE NO. U-4145 
-RENSSE-LAE-R-eiTY- SCHQOL- DISTRICT-UNIT,- -: 
RENSSELAER COUNTY EDUCATIONAL LOCAL, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., : 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
RQEME.R AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS., (RICHARD L. 
BURSTEIN, ESQ., of Counsel) Attorneys for 
Charging Party. 
ANTHONY P. DI ROCCO, : for.. THEALAN 
ASSOCIATES, representing Respondent. 
On July 20, 1979, the Rensselaer City School District <:Unit, 
Rensselaer County Educational Local, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) filed an 
improper practice charge against the Rensselaer City School 
District (District) alleging that the District violated §209-a.l(d-] 
of the Act by refusing to negotiate the imposition of a resolution 
making residency a factor in appointments to new or vacant posi- ;'. 
tions. 
The District adpcpted without prior negotiations a resolution 
providing for a residency preference for initial appointment and 
for subsequent promotional appointments, applicable only to 
Civil Service positions. The resolution does not apply to 
6387 
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employees hired before the date of the resolution so long as 
they remain in the position they then occupied,, Thus, current 
employees are affected by the resolution with regard to subsequent 
appointments to positions by promotion. The resolution estab-
lishes a three-level residency preference. Assuming candidates 
are otherwise qualified, first preference is given to residents 
of the City of Rensselaer, second preference to residents of 
Rensselaer County, and non-residents receive no preference. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge in its entirety. 
U 
Relying on'prior decisions of this Board, he held that the 
criteria for appointment or promotions are a managerial preroga-
tive if applicable only to prospective employees or the future 
promotion of current employees. He saw no basis in this regard 
to distinguish a residency preference from a residency requirement 
CSEA has filed exceptions. Its exceptions appear to concern 
that portion of the resolution establishing a residency preference 
for promotional appointments for current employees. It argues (1) that 
residency should not be recognized as a "qualification" for pro-
:motion and (2) that imposing the residency preference on promotions 
has a serious impact on terms- and conditions; of employment of 
current employees. 
17 West Irohdequoif Teachers' Asso'ciafion, 4 PERB 1f3070 (1971) ; 
City of Buffalo, 9 PERB fl3U15. (1976) ;' Cify of Auburn, 9 PERB 
113085 (1976) ; City of Salamanca, 12 PERB 13079 (1979) ; 
Fairview Fire District, 12 PERB 1[3083 (1979). 
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We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. We agree 
that the use of residency as a criterion for appointment or 
promotion is a managerial prerogative beyond the scope of 
mandatory negotiation, if applicable only to prospective employees1 
2/ 
or to future promotion of current employees. Contrary to CSEA's 
contention, the employer is free to establish new criteria for 
future incumbents of new or vacant positions to which employees 
may be promoted. New incumbents by' promotion'::"are in- no". ... 
different position, in this regard than new employees. According 
preference for promotion on the basis of residency is all the 
more permissible, as it does not necessarily, as in the case 
of an absolute residency requirement, preclude the ultimate 
possibility of promotion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge be,and it hereby 
is,,,dismissed in all respects. 
DATED: New York, New York 
2_/ " A hearing officer reached this conclusiori.'ih'i-
•'*" Board of Education of the' City School' District of the City of 
' New York, 12 PERB 8,[4~3ii3 (1979) . There was no exception to 
this part of the hearing officer's decision. Other aspects 
of that decision were challenged and affirmed, 13 PERB 1[3006 
(1980) 
UoOa 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
--S-UEEOLK-.COUNTY-CHAP-TER, -CIVIL .SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
LESTER B. LIPKIND, ESQ., (STUART LIPKIND, ESQ., 
of Counsel), Attorney for Charging Party. 
LEONARD KIMMELL, ESQ., Attorney for Respondent 
Suffolk County Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc. (CSEA) filed a charge alleging thati:the County of Suffolk 
(County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
discontinued the practice of assigning a county vehicle to 
Herman W. Hahn, a detective investigator in the Office of the 
Suffolk County District Attorney. The County's answer denied 
the allegations of the charge and asked PERB to defer jurisdiction 
to the parties' contractual grievance procedure. 
FACTS 
At the hearing, Hahn testified that he was employed as a 
detective investigator in 1967, that he was assured during employ-
ment interviews that he would be provided with transportation to 
arid from work, that he was given access to a County vehicle and 
that he continued to have such access until February 5, 1979. 
At that time, the vehicle used by Hahn was assigned to another 
//2B-8/7/80 
BOARD DECISION _•_ 
AND ORDER 
'CasFTTo: U-4TT45 
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detective investigator in the same office, whose own assigned 
County vehicle had been disabled and retired from use. To re-
solve a grievance filed by the other detective investigator, the 
District Attorney and the Chief Investigator agreed to provide 
him with the car used by Hahn. The senior investigator and the 
_other investigator ,in_ the_ of f ice to which Hahn _±s assigned ^cur-
rently have County vehicles assigned to them. Hahn filed a 
grievance complaining that he had no assigned vehicle. It has 
been submitted to arbitration, but no hearing has been held. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. Relying on a 
County standard operating procedure for assignment of motor 
vehicles, apparently codified on May 25, 1978, she found that 
the County's practice is to provide "transportation" through use 
of County motor pools, assignment of vehicles or reimbursement 
for the use of personal vehicles while on County business. She 
found no change in that practice. She further found that Hahn's 
benefit of an assigned vehicle was in excess of the procedure 
and that CSEA is not entitled to negotiate any change in a bene-
fit that is the result of an individual "contract" or "agreement" 
between Hahn and the County. 
In its exceptions, CSEA argues that the only relevent "prac-
tice" is that applicable to the District Court Bureau of the 
Office of the District Attorney of Suffolk County, the Bureau 
to which Hahn is assigned. It asserts that the record establishes 
that the "practice" applicable to the detective investigators of 
the Bureau was to use County vehicles. It urges that the hear-
ing officer improperly relied on a so-called County-wide practice 
Board Decision -3- Case No.. U-4045 
on the basis of a "standard operating procedure" manual which 
should not, in any event, have been received in evidence and was 
not established by testimony as being the County-wide practice. 
The County did not file any response to CSEA's exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
On the basis of the record, the hearing officer concluded 
that there was a relevant County-wide transportation practice 
which did not obligate the County to continue assignment of County 
vehicles to employees who previously received such benefit. We 
need not accept that conclusion. Even if we were to accept CSEA's 
contention that the only relevant "practice" is that applicable 
to the District Court Bureau of the Office of the District Attor-
ney of Suffolk County, we cannot find that that practice has been 
unilaterally terminated. The record shows that detective inves-
tigators, other than Hahn, continue to have County vehicles as-
signed to them. Thus, CSEA's argument amounts to a claim that the 
withdrawal of the benefit of the general practice from a single 
individual constitutes a unilateral change in the practice itself 
and, hence, in terms and conditions of employment of all the em-
ployees in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. We do not agree. 
A single instance of this kind does not constitute a violation of 
a public employer's duty to negotiate in good faith. Rather, 
this matter is appropriately one to be determined in accordance 
with the parties' grievance procedure. 
fits? 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in all respects. 
Dated, New York, New York 
August 5, 1980 
/Harold R. Newman, Chaxrman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies' Member 
In:.the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, : 
INC
-' : BOARD DECISION AND 
- a n d -
SAUL TCANDEL, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#208/7/80 
Respondent, ORDER 
Case No. U-3938 
Charging Party, 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS. 
(Pauline F. Rogers, Esq. of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
BENJAMIN M. ZELMAN, ESQ., for Charging 
Party 
On April 3, 1979, Saul Kandel (Kandel) filed an improper 
practice charge against the Civil Service Employees' Association, 
Inc. and its field representative, Edward Scherker (CSEA), alleging 
that CSEA violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by failing to properly 
represent him in a grievance filed against the State of New York 
(State). After a hearing, the hearing officer issued his decision 
on December 5, 1979 in which he dismissed the charge. Kandel has 
filed exceptions. CSEA has responded to those exceptions. We 
hereby affirm the hearing officer's decision and dismiss the charge 
DISCUSSION 
Kandel's grievance asserts his right to a hearing. His 
charge challenges CSEA's withdrawal of the grievance from arbi-
tration prior to his termination. 
After reviewing the record, we adopt in full the findings of 
Board Decision -2- - U-3938 
fact of the hearing officer. It would unduly lengthen this 
decision to repeat them. 
In his exceptions, Kandel urges that CSEA ignored his most 
forceful argument during its consideration of the merits of his 
grievance. He argues that, even if the letter of appointment 
does not estop the State from asserting that he was a probationary 
employee, his claim to permanent status is not necessarily 
defeated. This point has particular relevance, in our view, to 
the time prior to May 10, 1978, when an Article 78 proceeding 
might have been brought to directly challenge the State's position 
that Kandel was hired as a probationary employee by the Department 
of Social Services. The State's reliance on the circumstances 
relating to the activities of the Continuity of Employment Com-
mittee and the consequent determination that Kandel was not hired 
"off" the preferred list, may well be correct, but Kandel appar-
ently could only have challenged that determination in an Article 
78 proceeding. 
.'.'.. In this context, Scherker's letter of April 10, 1978, 
concerns us since it states that an Article 78 proceeding "is 
unnecessary . . . at this time", and that "your case can properly 
be adjudicated at the arbitration hearing". Nevertheless, we 
agree with the hearing officer that CSEA cannot be found to have 
handled this matter in a grossly negligent or irresponsible man-
1/ ner. — 
1/ Nassau Educational Chapter of the Syosset Central School Dis-
trict Unit, CSEA, Inc., 11 PERB J3010 (1978) 
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While there is reason to question whether reliance on 
the appointment letter was warranted after the third-step hearing, 
it is apparent that Scherker was misled as to the issue by the 
contents of the appointment letter. It appears that Kandel's own 
insistence that he was hired "off" the list could have lulled 
Scherker into believing that he had_a meritorious: grievance.. 
Scherker is not an attorney and his testimony suggests that he 
did not fully understand the function of an Article 78 proceeding. 
It further appears that the substantial backlog of arbitration 
cases delayed careful examination of Kandel's grievance by CSEA's 
attorneys until after May 10, 1978. Finally, we note that both 
Scherker and Kahn did make it clear to Kandel that he could in-
stitute his own Article 78 proceeding even though CSEA's attorneys 
did not do so. On balance, we conclude that there may have been 
an error of judgment, but not gross negligence or irresponsibility. 
We agree with the hearing officer that CSEA's decision 
ultimately to withdraw the grievance from arbitration was based 
on a subsequent thorough investigation of its factual and legal 
aspects. It is true that CSEA could have made it clearer to 
Kandel that it reserved the right to withdraw the appeal, but we 
cannot find that CSEA deliberately misled Kandel in any way or 
that it acted from any improper motive. 
Kandel's exceptions relating to the rulings of the hear-
ing officer during the hearing have been considered and we con-
clude that they are without merit. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, VIE ORDER that the charge be and it here-
y 
by is dismissed in all respects. 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 5, 1980 
£&£l >&A&> 
arol'd R. Newman, Chairman ~ im ^=**_ 
Ida Klaus" Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Mejafoer 
STATE OF NEW YOEK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-8/7/80 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASFTNOV U-3908 
JACKSON, LEWIS, SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN 
(ANTHONY H. ATLAS, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Respondent 
BEVERLY GROSS, ESQ. (IRVING H. GLASGOW, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Queens 
Borough Public Library Guild, Local 1321, District Council 37, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Guild) to the decision of a hearing officer 
dismissing its charge against the Queens Borough Public Library 
(Queens Borough). The charge alleges that Queens Borough violated 
its duty to negotiate in good faith in that it made unilateral 
changes in terms and conditions of employment during negotiations. 
Without considering the merits of the charge, the hearing officer 
granted a motion of Queens Borough to dismiss the charge on the 
ground that the Board lacked jurisdiction over it because Queens 
Borough is not a public employer within the meaning of the Taylor 
Law. In its exceptions, the Guild challenges this conclusion. 
A library, as such, may or may not be a public employer. A 
£oop 
• « O o o o 
In the Matter of 
QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY GUILD 
LOCAL 1321, D.C. 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
Board - U-3908 -2 
"public library" is an institution "established for free public 
purposes by official action of a municipality or district or the 
legislature where the whole interests belong to the public;". 
Education Law §253.2. Such an institution is clearly a public 
employer within the meaning of the Taylor Law. On the other hand, 
an "association library" is an institution "established and con-
trolled, in whole or in part, by a group of private individuals 
operating as an association, close corporation or as trustees 
under the provision of a will or deed of trust;". Education Law 
§253.2. Such a library is not a public employer. 
Queens.Borough does not fit neatly into either of these 
categories'. It was created by a special act of incorporation, 
Chapter 164 of the Laws of 1907, to succeed another library 
created by Chapter 580 of the Laws of 1901. Both the original and 
subsequent statutes were enacted to effectuate agreements between 
Andrew Carnegie, a private benefactor, and the City of New York 
whereby they would jointly fund a library system that would serve 
the people of the Borough of Queens. In this it is like the New 
York Public Library. There is only one significant difference be-
tween Queens Borough and the New York Public Library. The governance 
of the New York Public Library is in the hands of a self-perpetuating 
board of trustees— while Queens Borough is run by a board of 
trustees, all the members of which are appointed by the Mayor 
1 The record of proceedings in the New York Public Library case 
shows that the agreement establishing that library specified 
the appointment of 21 named trustees, one of whom, the 
Comptroller of the City of New York, was ex officio. The 
•named trustees were charged with managing the new corporation 
for the first year and with the adoption of bylaws which 
would "provide for the manner of election of new trustees 
after the expiration of the first year, their respective 
terms of office and the manner of filling vacancies in the 
. Board...". 
W O T 
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of the City of New York except for the Mayor himself, the City 
Comptroller and the President of the City Council, who are ex 
2 ~~ 
officio members of the Board,, 
On August 31, 1972, by a vote of 2 to 1, this Board deter-
mined that the New York Public Library was a public employer. 
Matter of New York Public Library, 5 PERB c,f3045 „ In reaching 
__ this jconclusion, the Board_..maj ority was influenced, in part,by the 
extent to which the activities of the New York Public Library 
were financed by the City of New York; more, by the extent to 
which the City of New York controlled the expenditures of funds 
by the New York Public Library; and most of all, by the extensive 
integration of the New York Public Library's employee relations 
program into the employee relations program of the City. The 
dissenting board member disagreed with his colleagues' emphasis 
upon the activities of the New York Public Library and asserted 
that the critical, factor.'wasiit-s. governatiee;.'''• He'.'• wrote''••••" :''-••"• 
2 The original act of incorporation of Queens Borough (L„ 1907, 
ch„ 164) provided that the Mayor, the Comptroller and the 
president of the Board of Aldermen of the City of New York 
would be ex officio members of the board of trustees and 
that the selection of other trustees would be subject to 
the approval of the Mayor„ This was amended six years later 
(L. 1913, ch. 541) to provide that the non-ex officio members 
of the board of trustees would be appointed by the Mayor. 
The incorporating statute was not amended again until Chapter 
695 of the Laws of 1979., As amended, it now provides: 
"The board of trustees of the Queens Borough 
Public Library shall consist of nineteen members 
chosen in the following manner. The mayor of" the 
city of New York shall select at least one trustee 
from among the residents of each geographical area 
constituting a community board district in the bor-
ough of Queens... They shall serve until July first, 
nineteen hundred eighty-three. Trustees shall serve 
thereafter for terms of four years." 
QfW\t 
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(at 5 PERB pages 3081 and 3082): 
"The primary attribute of the New York Public Library 
which it has in common with free association libraries 
-- i.e., governance by a 'self-perpetuating' board of 
trustees -- is more consistent with private sector 
status than with the conclusion that it is an instru-
mentality of government. The most significant attribute 
of a government is its political responsibility to the 
community. This responsibility may be a direct one, as 
in the case of elected public officials and their 
employees; it may also be an indirect one, as in the 
case of public corporations. The people who run public 
corporations are appointed by one or more state or local 
officials." (emphasis supplied) 
The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the major-
ity of this Board and ruled that the New York Public Library is 
not a public employer. New York Public Library v. PERB, 45 AD2d 
271 (First Dept., 1974). At least in part, the Appellate Division 
appears to have been influenced by the analysis of the dissenting 
board member that the governance of the New York Public Library 
by a self-perpetuating board of trustees was indicative of its 
status as a private, rather than a public,employer. Justice 
Tilzer's opinion noted, at page 278, that the: 
"hire, discharge and promotion of the employees 
[of the library] as well as the supervision of 
their daily and over-all duties are vested in 
the Library through its self-perpetuating Board 
of Trustees." 
and again, at page 283: 
"The Library, as noted earlier, is a private, 
separate legal entity controlled by an inde-
pendent Board of Trustees." 
The Appellate Division decision was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals, New York Public Library v. PERB, 37 NY2d 752 (1978) 
6401 
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in a memorandum decision which stated (at p. 753): 
"The short of it is that the instant public 
library employment satisfies in some respects 
the character of public employment and in other 
substantial respects does not, and that the 
Taylor Law applies only to employment that is 
unequivocally or substantially public. As Mr. 
Justice Tilzer's opinion demonstrates, the non-
public aspect of library employment is sufficiently 
substantial to exclude it from regulation under 
the Taylor Law, as it now reads." 
As the only significant difference between Queens Borough 
and the New York Public Library is in the governance of the two 
institutions, the issue before us is whether that factor is suf-
ficient to establish a different status for the two libraries. 
The hearing officer ruled that it is not. We believe that it does 
make a sufficient difference. 
As is apparent from the memorandum decision of the Court 
of Appeals, the New York Public Library is close to the line be-
tween public and private status, but the court did not furnish a 
preeise.:.5guide;;.tQ.help us find that line. Such a line, however, may 
be drawn from the language of other courts in other decisions. 
The earliest and most important is the language of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, 17 US 518 (1819). In that case, the court 
held that the State of New Hampshire could not alter the charter 
of Dartmouth College without its consent because the College was 
a private, rather than a public corporation. Much of the dis-
cussion involved consideration of the nature of public and private 
corporations. In a concurring opinion, Justice Story noted (at 
page 671) that private corporations no less than public corpora-
Board - U-3908 , -6 
tions may be devoted to public services, but that they could be 
distinguished because, 
"when-the corporation is said at the bar to be 
public, it is not merely meant that the whole 
community may be the proper objects^of the 
bounties, but that the government have the sole 
right, as trustees of the public interest, to 
regulate, control and direct the corporation, 
and its funds-and -its franchises,r at; its own 
good will and pleasure." 
By way of contrast, Mr. Justice Marshall spoke of a private cor-
poration (at page 657): 
"A corporation is defined by Mr. Justice 
Blackstone to be a franchise. 'It is,' 
says he, 'a franchise for a body politic, 
with a power to maintain perpetual succession, 
and to do corporate acts. ...'" 
This distinction between public and private corporations has been 
embraced by the courts of New York State. The furnishing of pub-
lic services, the receipt of public funds and tax exemption status 
may characterize a not-for-profit corporationas well as a public 
coproration, but public corporations alone are governed by man-
agers who derive their authority from government. Van Campen v. 
Olean General Hospital, 210 App Div 204 (Fourth Dept., 1924), aff'd 
239 NY 615 (1925). Such is the situation here. The Queens 
Borough is governed by trustees who derive their authority from 
government. 
In the New York Public Library case, the courts ruled that 
the Taylor Law definition of public employer did not encompass 
that library. Although much -of the opinion of the Appellate Divi-
sion focused on the language of that definition, it would appear 
Board - U-3908 -7 
that the decisive fact was the governance of the library, which 
made it a private, not-for-profit corporation. Thus, Queens 
Borough, a public corporation fits within the Taylor Law definition. 
The Taylor Law enumerates six categories of public employers, 
§201. 6(a). The last category of public employer specified in the 
Taylor Law is "any other public corporation, agency or instrumen-
tality or unit of government which exercises governmental powers -
3 
under the laws of the state."— On the record before us, we find 
that Queens Borough meets this definition. 
In deciding that Queens Borough.was not such a public 
corporation, the hearing officer relied upon language in our de-
cision in North Couhtry Library 'System, 1 PERB f 399. 48 (1968). In 
that decision, written In the first year of this agency, this 
Board said that to be a public corporation, the corporation must 
exercise powers 
"which may be exercised only by the state... 
or by a lesser governmental body to which such 
powers have been delegated by the state; By 
way of example, they would include the power 
to tax, to enact general legislation which is 
judicially enforceable, to take by eminent 
domain, and to exercise police powers." 
(emphasis in original) 
In stressing the examples given by this Board in North Country, 
the hearing officer did not recognize that the main line of rea-
soning in that case supports our decision here. Our reasoning 
followed the analysis of the Supreme Court in Dartmouth College 
3 Queens Borough may also be a public benefit corporation as it 
operates, a facility for the use of the public at large. (See 
General Corporation Law, §3.4, and General City Law, §20^ .e.2[b]). 
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and the State courts in Van Campen. Mr. Justice Tilzer's opinion 
noted this Board's main line of reasoning (at page 283): 
"In the North Country Library System case, 
supra, PERB noted that the Library therein 
was not an agency of government since its 
board of trustees was not appointed by any 
government and the Library existed separate 
and apart from any governmental agency." 
We now realize that the examples of governmental powers 
which were given by this Board in North Country Library System 
are too.narrow and do not encompass the operative characteristics 
of "government". Governmental powers, of course, include the 
performance of funct ions that may also be performed by private 
institutions. Governments provide educational services, but so 
do private institutions. Governments provide transportation 
services, but so do private institutions. Governments provide 
sanitation services, but so do private institutions. The powers 
referred to in the sixth category of the definition in §201.6(a) 
of the Taylor Law are merely the authority of the public corpora-
tion to conduct its day-to-day affairs in the course of furnishing 
the services that it provides pursuant to law. 
Queens Borough is controlled by a board of trustees, all 
the members of which derive their authority from the Mayor of 
the City of New York, except for the ex officio members, who 
are themselves elected officials of the City of New York. This 
distinguishes Queens Borough from the New York Public Library and is 
Board - U-3908 -9 
sufficient to constitute Queens Borough as a public employer with-
in the meaning of the Taylor Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REMAND this matter to the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
for consideration of the merits of the charge. 
Dated, New York, New York 
August 7, 1980 
^s^x^ve^. 
Harold R. Newman,Chairman 
i&+, /&2*M^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
640S 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e Matter of ' #2E-8/7/80 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD DECISION AND 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, : ORDER OF REMAND 
Respondent, : 
-arid- '"'" : Case No.' TT-W93 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL #2, : 
AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS P. RYAN, for Respondent 
DAVID N. STEIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
On May 9, 1980, United Federation of Teachers, Local #2, 
AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO (Local #2) filed a charge alleging that the 
Board of Education of the City of New York (Employer) discrimi-
nated against unit employees because Local #2 invoked arbitration 
and that it negotiated in bad faith. 
On two occasions, Local #2 failed to appear and failed 
to notify the hearing officer that it would not appear at a sched-
uled conference, and on July 10, 1980, the hearing officer dis-
missed the charge for lack of prosecution. 
On July 15, 1980, Local #2 filed exceptions to the deci-
sion of the hearing officer. In support of those exceptions, 
it offered a reasonable explanation as to why it failed to appear 
at the conference and why it failed to appear or notify the Board 
or hearing officer that it would not appear at the conference. 
Board - U-4695 
The employer's representative has indicated that he does not ob-
ject to the rescheduling of this matter. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that this matter be remanded to 
the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation for a 
proceeding on the merits. 
DATED: August 7, 1980 
New York, New York 
<&4L fcj2u*s* 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO SEWER AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED ENVIRONMENTAL WORKERS, 
Petitioner, 
-i.and-
LOCAL 1047, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED ENVIRONMENTAL WORKERS, 
• Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 1047, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
RAUL FIGORUA, ESQ,, for Employer 
SARGEANT & REPKA, P.C. (NICHOLAS J. 
SARGEANT, ESQ., of Counsel) for 
Petitioner/Respondent 
ROWLEY & FORREST (RICHARD R. ROWLEY, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Intervenor/Charging Party 
On November 28, 1979, United Environmental Workers (UEW) 
filed a timely petition (Case C-1978) to decertify Local 1047, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 1047), as the representative of a unit of 
full-time blue-collar employees of the Buffalo Sewer Authority 
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(employer). Although the petition did not explicitly so state, 
UEw also seeks to represent those employees in the existing nego-
tiating unit, as indicated by the showing of interest that accom-
1 
panied the petition. The Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) determined that UEW was an employee 
organization and that it was seeking to represent public employees 
in an uncontested negotiating unit. Accordingly, he directed that 
there be an election. 
Local 1047 has filed exceptions to the decision of the 
Director. In its exceptions, it argues that UEW is not an 
employee organization and that its petition is defective. It also 
1_ The petition form contains three boxes and the petitioner is 
instructed to check those boxes that are appropriate. 
The petitioner did not check Box A. The text accompanying Box 
A is : 
"Certification of negotiating representative - A sub-
stantial number of employees wish to be represented 
for purposes of collective negotiations by Petitioner 
and Petitioner desires to be certified as representative 
of the employees for purposes of collective negotiations 
pursuant to Section 207 of the Act." 
The petitioner did not check Box B, which is appropriate only 
when the petition is signed by an employer. The petitioner 
checked Box C. The text accompanying Box C is: 
"Decertification - a substantial number of employees 
assert that the currently recognized or certified 
negotiating representative should be deprived of 
representation status as defined in Section 207 of 
the Act." 
The showing of interest accompanying the petition states: 
"We, the undersigned, designate the United Environmental 
Workers as an employee organization, as our sole and 
exclusive representative for the purpose of negotiating 
collectively with our public employer...We, the under-
signed understand that this authorization is for the 
purpose of obtaining a sufficient showing of interest 
in order that a representation election may be conducted 
by the Public Employment Relations. Board." 
|[Jk* k % f 
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argues that UEW should be disqualified from representing the unit 
employees because its leaders had violated a fiduciary obliga-
tion to Local 1047. In this connection, it argues that the 
hearing officer and the Director erred in that they failed to 
disqualify the attorney for UEW, asserting that the attorney, 
too,I had violated a.fiduciary obligation to Local 1047.- Finally, 
Local 1047 urges that, even if UEW is an employee organization 
and should not be disqualified from representing unit employees, 
the election should be postponed at least a year because the 
alleged improper conduct of UEW's leaders had so interfered with 
maintenance of laboratory conditions under which elections should 
be held that a current election could not fairly reflect the 
true preference of unit employees. 
On April 4, 1980, Local 1047 also filed an improper prac-
tice charge against UEW (Case U-4643). In it, as in its excep-
tions in the representation case, Local 1047 alleges that UEW's 
leadership violated a fiduciary obligation which it owed to 
Local 1047. The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that 
it does not allege facts which would constitute a violation of 
§209-a of the Taylor Law. Local 1047 has filed exceptions to 
this determination too. In support of its exceptions, it ad-
vances the same arguments that have been made in support of some 
of its exceptions in the. representation case. Accordingly, we 
consolidate both cases for decision. 
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FACTS 
There are about 250 full-time blue-collar workers in the 
negotiating unit. Since 1948, Local 1047 has represented these 
employees. Robert E.einig has been an officer of that union for 
almost twenty years and has been president of : it for about half 
that time. He called a meeting of Local 1047 for October 10, 1979 
to consider the formation of a new union. Approximately 75% of 
the membership of Local 1047 attended the meeting and the members 
in attendance unanimously decided to seek the decertification of 
Local 1047 and to replace it with a new organization to be known 
as United Environmental Workers. The law firm which has represented 
Local 1047 had already been asked to assist the executive board of 
Local 1047 in the preparation of bylaws for the new organization, 
and those bylaws were presented to and adopted by the unit employees 
in attendance at the meeting. Two hundred twenty unit employees then 
executed the documents which were filed as the showing of interest 
in_sup_pjoxi__o_f_the_JJE¥_p_eJ:_iJ:_iQn 
Thereafter, Reinig, who was designated the acting president 
of UEW, withdrew sums on deposit in a Local 1047 operating fund 
account and in a Local 1047 flower fund account and he deposited 
that money in two similar accounts in the name of UEW. AFSCME, 
the parent organization, then placed Local 1047 in trusteeship, 
suspended its officers, and appointed Anthony Corbo as the ad-
ministrator of the Local. In this capacity, Corbo received the 
dues of unit employees which were being deducted by the Buffalo 
Sewer Authority and which amounted to approximately $2,750.00 
Q W O 
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a month. He also took control of approximately $10,000 of Local 
1047's operating funds and $250,000 of its Health and Welfare 
fund. Reinig then obtained a preliminary injunction from the 
Supreme Court restraining Corbo from spending any of the funds 
of Local 1047 which were in his possession; and there is now 
pending a Tawsuit to determine whether the moneys belong to 
Local 1047 or to the unit employees. 
In the Supreme Court proceedings, Local 1047 sought to 
disqualify UEW's attorney from appearing on UEW's behalf because 
he had previously represented the Local. The court declined to 
do so, saying that: 
"The attorney has at all times represented 
the membership and when the membership 
desired a change, he is justified in pursuing 
ways to effectuate the change." 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record of the proceedings, including 
the materials relating to the lawsuit which was submitted by 
Local 1047, we affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law of the Director in both the representation and improper prac-
tice cases. 
For the reasons set forth in his decision, we agree with 
the Director that UEW is an employee organization within the 
meaning of §201.5 of the Taylor Law. We also agree with the 
Director that the technical deficiency in the petition is not a 
basis for rejecting it. The hearing officer and the Director 
committed no error when they determined that the dispute between 
the two organizations concerning the disposition of the funds of 
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Local 1047 raised no Taylor Law issues and, therefore, could not 
be a basis for disqualification of UEW in any proceedings before 
this Board. 
In the private sector, the fiduciary obligations of union 
officers to their organization and its members are set forth in 
Title V of the Labor-Management ^ Reporting arid Disclosures A c t o f 
1959. In part the provisions of that law are enforceable by the 
U.S. Department of Labor and in part by civil suit. They are 
not within the purview of the authority of the National Labor 
Relations Board. New York State, too.,, has enacted laws specifying 
the fiduciary obligations of officers and agents of a union 
(Labor Law Article 20-a, L. '59, c.451). Although originally the 
^ State Industrial Commissioner was given the major enforcement 
responsibilities, those responsibilities were diminished by L.'71, 
c.329,- and enforcement is now left primarily to civil and criminal 
proceedings (Labor Law §725).— Like the NLRB in the private 
sector, PERB is given no enforcement responsibility where a •-.•),,•• 
complaint chi£ge^-^finanGial';'imp'rbprieties'- ;inC;the internal :affarrs 
_ ,...-, 3 
ox;..a- union;.^:: •-. '.;;'.:•.••;....'• 
— But see §727 for remaining enforcement responsibilities of 
the Industrial Commissioner. 
^ See CSEA and Bogack, 9 PERB 1f3064 (1976) in which we held that 
this Board may not entertain complaints, that deal with the 
internal affairs of a union unless they directly affect 
employees' terms and conditions of employment. 
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The remaining argument made by Local 1047 is that no elec-
tion should be held now because the dispute over financial re-
sources has prevented the achievement of the laboratory condi-
tions necessary for an election to determine the true preference 
of the employees as between the two organizations. In partic-
ular, it argues that by obtaining a preliminary injunction which 
prevents Local 1047 from using its funds, Reinig and the other 
leaders of UEW have "sabotaged" Local 1047's ability to present 
itself to the employees or to represent them. We do not find 
this argument persuasive. We conclude that both Local 1047 and 
its past officers who are now leaders of UEW are capable at this 
time of contending as distinct and identifiable rivals for the 
support of the unit members and that the unit members are capable 
of evaluating them as such and making an informed choice between 
4 
them.— An expeditious election should be held to resolve the. 
dispute so that orderly collective bargaining may proceed. 
—
 With respect to the intervenor's contention based on the dis-
pute as to the funds involved, we find a somewhat parallel 
situation in Hershey Chocolate Corporation, 121 NLRB 901 (1958). 
In that case, the NLRB directed that an election be held be-
tween a union holding a contract and a competing union which 
was supported by 42 of 43 members of the executive board of the 
first union and most of its members. Like the case before us, 
there was a dispute concerning the disposition of the assets 
of the first union. In Hershey, a current contract between 
the first union and the employer would have barred an election 
at that time under ordinary circumstances. Thus, rather than 
being a justification for delaying an election following a 
timely petition, the defections from the first union, and the 
dispute over the union's funds were seen as justification for 
an immediate U" election that would not have otherwise been 
timely. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decisions of the Director, 
and WE ORDER THAT, 
1. In Case No. :o-1978: 
(a) An election be held by secret ballot 
under the supervision of the Director among the 
employees "of"the BuTf alo iS^wer Authority in the 
stipulated unit, who were employed on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this deci-: /,... 
Siion, and 
(b) ThetBuffalo:.:Set?er'"Authority.: submit:i': •.:'.•': 
to the Director as well as to the petitioner and 
the intervenor, within seven days from the date 
of receipt of this decision, an.', alphabetized 
list of employees in the negotiating unit set 
forth above who were employed on the payroll date 
immediately preceding the date of this decision; 
and 
2. In Case No. U-4643, the charge herein be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
August 6, 1980 
^fess^? 
l a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
3^y^u<^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RENSSELAER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
-RENSSELAER CITY SCHOOL - DISTRICT- -UNXT- OF 
RENSSELAER COUNTY EDUCATIONAL CHAPTER 




BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3504 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH (STEPHEN J. 
WILEY, ESQ.," of Counsel) for Charging" Party 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES, INC. (ANTHONY P. DI 
ROCCO) for ResTDohden't . : : • 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Rensselaer City School District Unit of Rensselaer County Educa-
tional Chapter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
(CSEA) to the decision of a hearing officer dismissing its charge 
In that charge, CSEA had alleged that the Rensselaer City School 
District (District) had committed an improper practice when, in 
June 1978, it unilaterally issued notices to unit employees con-
tinuing their services for the school year following the 1978 
school recess. The hearing offi cer determined that in all mater-
ial respects the action taken by the District was identical to 
that held to be permissible in Spencerport Central School District 
12 PERB 1(3074 (1979), in which the majority of this Board held 
that, 
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"[t]he employer's conduct in unilaterally 
offering employees continued employment, a 
non-mandatory subject of negotiation, is not 
in itself, wrongful...." 
In support of its exceptions, CSEA contends that the-
majority decision in Spencerport was wrong. It presents no new 
arguments in support of that contention, but relies upon the 
dissenting opinion in Spencerport. 
For the reasons stated in Spencerport, we affirm the 
decision of the hearing officer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
August 7, 1980 
l£gry*tr&^~<-~' 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, er 
Member Klaus dissents for the reasons stated in her 
dissenting opinion in Spencerport. 
Zk<L {& *A€A 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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Case No. U-3117 
NASSAU CHAPTER CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES : 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
JACK OLCHIN, ESQ., for Respondent 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ. (BARRY J. 
PEEK, ESQ., of Counsel) for 
Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Nassau 
Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., (CSEA) to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge. The charge 
aXIeges that the-County of Nassau (County) violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith by refusing to negotiate both the impos-
ition and the impact of a revised work schedule for employees 
in the Personal Health Services Unit of the Department of Health. 
Until January 3, 1978, the employees worked 33-3/4 hours a week 
as follows: 6-3/4 hours a day, Monday through Friday. For 
Saturday and Sunday work and other overtime, the contract provided 
that the employees could choose to be compensated at premium pay 
or be given compensatory time off at a premium rate. After Janu-
L. 
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ary 3, 1978, with the changed schedule,the employees continued to 
work five days a week, 6-3/4 hours a day, but the five work days 
could include Saturdays and Sundays. For overtime work the em-
ployees were given premium pay, but denied the opportunity to 
elect compensatory time off at a premium rate. 
. The .hearing of fic.er_ dismissed ...so.- much- of the charge as 
alleged a refusal to negotiate the imposition of the new schedule. 
He did so on the basis of contract language which stated that the 
County had the right "to regulate work schedules". He noted that 
in two prior cases involving Health Department employees of the 
County of Nassau, this Board has held that this language consti- : 
tuted a waiver of CSEA's right, if any, to negotiate as to work 
1 
schedules.-
The hearing officer also dismissed so much of the charge 
as alleged a refusal to negotiate as to impact because, he deter-
mined, it did do so. The record shows that CSEA made a demand "to 
negotiate both the change in the work week and the impact of said 
change" and that the demand was refused. Nevertheless, three 
meetings were held between CSEA and representatives of the County 
at which this matter was discussed, but no agreement resulted. 
The hearing officer concluded that those meetings were for the 
purpose of negotiating impact and that, when no agreement was 
reached, CSEA did not press the matter. With respect to the 
— In the Matter of County of Nassau (Nassau County Medical Center), 
12 PERB 1[3049 (1979) , and In the Matter of County of Nassau, 
12 PERB 1f3105 (1979). 
6420 
County's elimination of the employees' option to take overtime in 
compensatory time off at a premium rate, the hearing officer said, 
'the allegation raises only a claimed breach of agreement, outside 
PERB's jurisdictional grant." 
Having considered CSEA's arguments in support of its ex-
ceptions and reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law of the hearing officer for the reasons 
set forth in his decision. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
August 7, 1980 
Board - U-3117 -3 
ik&e^p 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
JJ£?L /C&L***^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
w<^^T, 
avid C.'R.andles, Member 
I'lilRn SB .3 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BEACON ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, . -
- and -




Case No. C-2062 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above-matter by—the- -Public -Employment - Relations- Board in accoxdance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the. Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Beacon Classroom Support 
Staff Association, NYEA,,NEA 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose- of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teaching Assistants 
Excluded: All others. 
Further, IT IS.ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with- the.Beacon Classroom Support Staff 
Association, NYEA, NEA 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 5th day of August, 1980 
New York, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
,0/fiO.fl 
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M E M O R A N D U M 
August 12, 1980 
Re: Grievance Arbitration Panel 
Persons who are candidates for membership on the 
grievance arbitration panel must demonstrate that they 
have substantial experience in the conduct of arbitra-
tion hearings and the writing of arbitration awards. 
Experience as advocates before arbitration tribunals 
or individual arbitrators may not be substituted. The 
Director of Conciliation should review the grievance 
arbitration panel needs based on caseload and recommend 
to the Board such persons as he determines meet the 
necessary criteria. At the time of submission of can-
didates names to the Board, each vita must be accompanied 
by five recent arbitration awards, written by the appli-
cant . 
Applicants having been former professional employees 
of this agency -for at least five years, and who have dem-
onstrated appropriate skills, may be given special consid-
eration for admission to the arbitration panel. 
